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Abstract: This paper continues the prior research undertaken by Warren and Leitch (2009), in which a series of 
initial research findings were presented. These findings identified that in Australia, Supply Chain Management 
(SCM) systems were the weak link of Australian critical infrastructure. This paper focuses upon the security and 
risk issues associated with SCM systems and puts forward a new SCM Security Risk Management method, 
continuing the research presented at the European Conference of Information Warfare in 2009.This paper 
proposes a new Security Risk Analysis model that deals with the complexity of protecting SCM critical 
infrastructure systems and also introduces a new approach that organisations can apply to protect their SCM 
systems. The paper describes the importance of SCM systems from a critical infrastructure protection 
perspective. The paper then discusses the importance of SCM systems in relation to supporting centres of 
populations and gives examples of the impact of failure. The paper proposes a new SCM security risk analysis 
method that deals with the security issues related to SCM security and the security issues associated with 
Information Security. The paper will also discuss a risk framework that can be used to protect against high and 
low level associated security risks using a new SCM security risk analysis method. 
Keywords: critical infrastructure, security risk analysis and supply change management 
1. Introduction 
Prior research undertaken (Warren and Leitch, 2009), presented a series of initial research findings 
identifying that within Australia, Supply Chain Management (SCM) systems formed the weakest link of 
Australian critical infrastructure. One of the issues facing Australia is that the majority of critical 
infrastructure resides under the control of the business sector and certain aspects (such as SCM 
systems) are distributed entities. This proves to be a very important factor when you look at areas 
such as food distribution. 
Researchers (Pye et ai, 2005) have identified that Supply chain, value chain, demand chain, critical 
chain, and supply network are key description terms in relation to SCM. These terms are used 
somewhat interchangeably in the literature to refer to a conceptual chain of cooperating business 
partners that facilitates the bi-directional flow of information and goods and services to which it adds 
cumulative value from raw materials to the consumer (Pye et ai, 2005). 
The common areas that IT is used in conjunction with SCM systems are (Warren and Hutchinson, 
2000): 
m Managing information about demand. Providing on-line information from customer service, sales 
support, etc. to the required business area or customer. 
• Managing physical flow of goods. Provide on-line information to aid production planning, 
procurement, inventory management, etc. 
B Managing financial flows. The ability of financial organizations to supply suppliers and customers 
with detailed financial information on-line. 
B Order management. Being able to assist the order management cycle by offering on-line cost 
estimation and pricing, on-line order planning and order generation, on-line order billing and 
account/payment management, etc. 
In a Australian context, the Food Chain Assurance Advisory Group (the Food Chain Group) forms part 
of the of the Australian TISN (Trusted Information Sharing Network), overseeing critical infrastructure 
protection. The primary aim of the Food Chain Group has been to improve the security of the 
agriculture and food supply chain in the changed global security environment. The existing food safety 
and security systems and food regulatory arrangements are primarily aimed at preventing and 
detecting natural or accidental risks. The new challenge is to ensure these systems are now capable 
of responding to the new increased potential for acts of deliberate and malicious intervention including 
cyber based activities (FCIAAG, 2007). 
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This paper proposes a new Security Risk Analysis model that deals with the complexity of protecting 
SCM critical infrastructure systems and also put forwards a new approach that organisations can 
apply to protect their SCM systems. 
The importance of SCM systems from a critical infrastructure protection perspective will be discussed 
and the proposal of a new security risk analysis method that can be used to protect SCM systems will 
be introduced. The proposal of an initial SCM security risk analysis method that deals with the security 
issues related to SCM security and critical infrastructure protection will include a risk framework that 
can be used to protect organisations against high and low level associated security risks. A number of 
case studies to illustrate the new SCM security risk analysis method will be used to show the 
method's effectiveness. The paper will also discuss the difficulty in linking high and low level 
associated security risks. 
The conclusion of this paper will end with a discussion about the next stage of the research and some 
of the key variables that need to be identified for future research. 
2. USA response to supply chain security 
In response to the security situation following September, 11 th, 2001, the USA government has 
identified this as a potential security risk in relation to supply chain security and the importing of goods 
into the USA. In response to the situation of September 11 th, the US Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) developed the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). 
The aim of the C-TPAT strategic plan is designed to (CBP, 2004): 
• Improve security of a significant percentage of shipments to the United States; 
• Provide benefits and incentives to private sector companies that meet or exceed C-TPAT supply 
chain security criteria and best practices; and 
• Concentrate CBP's inspectional resources and capabilities on higher risk shipments. 
Organisations can apply to become member of the C-TAPT program, which offers a number of 
benefits including (CBP, 2004): 
• A reduced number of inspections and reduced border wait times; 
B A C-TPAT supply chain specialist to serve as the liaison for validations, security issues, 
procedural updates, communication and training; 
• Access to the C-TPAT members through the Status Verification Inter face; 
• Self-policing and self-monitoring of security activities; 
9 Certified C-TPAT importers are eligible for access to the FAST lanes on the Canadian and 
Mexican borders; 
m C-TPAT certified highway carriers, on the Canadian and Mexican borders, benefit from their 
access to the expedited cargo processing at designated FAST lanes. These carriers are eligible 
to receive more favorable mitigation relief from monetary penalties; 
m C-TPAT certified Mexican manufacturers benefit from their access to the expedited cargo 
processing at the designated FAST lanes. 
The US Customs and Border Protection were integrated into the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). DHS undertook a review of SCM security and developed a number of new strategic principles 
in relation to Supply Chain Security; these are (DHS, 2007) 
SO-1: Provide for end-to-end supply chain security by building trusted relationships and assisting 
trading partners and the trade community with enhancing their security systems. 
SO-2: Provide incentives and benefits for supply chain partners who enhance their supply chain 
security, while recognizing that some benefits (e.g., increased security resulting in reduced cargo loss 
and/or reduced costs of doing business) are trade-driven issues. 
SO-3: Advance security by promoting the development and implementation of international standards. 
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SO-4: Increase the availability and use of appropriate data in order to maintain complete awareness 
of the supply chain activities and target Department resources to the highest risk movements. 
SO-5: Utilize and provide WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) detection systems at ports of origin 
and entry, in order to provide for a defense in depth, layered system. 
SO-6: Expedite movement of low-risk shipments through the supply chain, while maintaining a level of 
detection such that even low-risk shipments are screened for high-consequence threats (e.g., WMD 
detection). 
SO-7: Provide clear communications with the trade community and our international trading partners 
in order to facilitate recovery efforts. 
SO-8: Ensure that data gathered during normal operations is also sufficient to allow for the 
management of resumption activities following a supply chain disruption. 
SO-9: Promote technological development of detection systems which increase the probability of 
detection, decrease "false positive" detections, and expedite processing times in order to promote 
rapid trade movement. 
SO-1O: Leverage key nodes in the supply chain to provide for specific scanning, screening, and 
inspections activities in order to detect and deter illicit use of the supply chain. 
SO-11: Develop systems which automate and expedite the use of Department resources. 
SO-12: Provide, or support development of, a robust cargo security system that will withstand a 
supply chain disruption, and rapidly resume pre-incident or near pre-incident status. 
SO-13: Provide for a flexible, standardized response mechanism which includes processes to 
facilitate trade resumption in short and long term recovery operations. 
SO-14: Promote development of modal-specific technologies and systems to ensure security of cargo 
while in transit. 
SO-15: Leverage agreements with foreign partners to facilitate investigative activities related to the 
detection of illicit material in the supply chain. 
3. Research update 
Prior research by the authors has focused on looking at the development of security risk analysis 
models and their applicability to SCM systems. This research has been presented at previous 
European Information Warfare Conferences (Leitch and Warren, 2009). This prior research proposed 
the use of 011 - SRA (Organisational Information Infrastructure - Security Risk Analysis) method to 
protect SCM systems. The Oll-SRA method is concerned about CII protection (Busuttil and Warren, 
2002, Busuttil and Warren, 2004, Busuttil and Warren, 2005, Warren and Busuttil 2007). Analysis by 
the researchers has identified that the Oll-SRA is only focused on security at the process level and 
relies upon a consensus decision making process in relation to security decisions. Theoretically this 
may seem an appropriate method but in reality would be considered unworkable; therefore the 
researchers have looked at alternative ways of protecting CII systems. 
The authors reflected upon the security requirements of SCM and the associated level of security 
risks and have developed a conceptual model that represents this view point; this is shown in Figure 
1. 
One of the key problems in developing a risk analysis method is how to deal with the complexity 
involved with SCM security as shown in Figure 1. After a thorough assessment it was found that a risk 
method called ODESSA may be suitable (Warren, 2001). This method was originally developed to 
deal with the complexity of healthcare security risk but the authors believe that the flexibility of the 
ODESSA method can deal with security issues associated with SCM. In the following sections the 
authors put forward a new method ODESSA-SCM and also propose an initial conceptual model that 
will be the nexus for future development. 
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High Level Security Risks 
(Policy focused) 
SCM Security Risks 
(Operational Focused) 
IT Security Risks 
(Technology Focused) 
Figure 1: Conceptual model of SCM security risk 
4. The rationale of ODESSA-SCM method 
The rationale of ODESSA-SCM is that at a basic level, SCM organisations would have similar security 
requirements but beyond this basic level the security countermeasures are unique to each SCM 
organisation. 
Within ODESSA-SCM, security is examined from the context of the whole SCM, with the main 
factors that influence the whole SCM being considered, which may range from the size of the 
SCM, organisations involved, to the sensitivity and type of data supporting the SCM. 
These elements have been incorporated into a framework as shown in Figure 2. This diagram 
illustrates the steps involved (at a theoretical level) in determining the security requirements for a 
SCM. 
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The ODESSA system suggests three sets of security countermeasures. 
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Baseline Countermeasures 
These represent the minimally acceptable security countermeasures for SCM organisations. 
Appropriate Countermeasures 
These represent the unique SCM security countermeasures. They are based upon a series of 
questions from which data sensitivity profiles are formed. 
Selected Countermeasures 
These represent the selected countermeasures from stages one and two that have been selected by 
the SCM organisation and reviewed. 
4.1 Steps of ODESSA-SCM 
The steps of ODESSA-SCM are described in the following section of the paper. 
Step 1: Organisational Environment Assessment 
This considers the physical environment in which the SCM assets are located which may affect the 
level of protection required. Table 1 gives examples of environmental considerations that may have to 
be considered. 
Table 1: Organisational environments 
Type Options Comments 
Location Inner City Location may indicate risk of 
vandalism, and theft 
Outer City Threats from fires from rural 
areas, increased chance of theft 
due to location 
Rural Location may be at threat from 
natural disasters, e.g. bushfire 
Transnational Risk of political or natural 
occurrence, e.g. war or pandemic 
Step 2: Organisational Type 
This stage relates to the different organisational types that exist within the SCM sector. The baseline 
security countermeasures are tailored to these different SCM organisations (e.g. giving advice to staff 
that may be using laptops in remote locations). The research included a comparison of past 
healthcare security reviews, which helped to form the baseline security needs for the different types 
as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Organisational types 
Type Description 
Regional Based SCM A localised SCM environment, e.g. a 
manufacturing process being supplied by local 
sUJlPliers 
National SCM A SCM that spans a national environment, e.g. food 
distribution; 
Trans-Regional SCM A SCM that services a region, e.g. SCM servicing the 
European Union market; 
Global SCM A global SCM, e.g. niche scenario a single provider 
supplying a global market. 
Some of the organisational factors would trigger other forms of security protection, e.g. a global SCM 
would need to be compliant with US C-TAP security standards. 
Step 3: Organisational Baseline Security 
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The concept of baseline within ODESSA relates to the minimal security levels requirements that an 
organisation should have installed (Warren, 1997). Examples of baseline security methods that could 
be applied include: 
• AS/NZS ISOIIEC 27001 :2006 - Security Techniques (AS/NZS, 2006); 
• IT Sector Baseline Risk Assessment (DHS, 2009); 
D ISO 28000 - Specification for security management systems for the supply chain (ISO, 2007). 
Step 4: Organisational Requirements 
At this stage the use of the data is considered and evaluated. Many SCM systems use similar 
sensitive data types which require the same generic security countermeasures, i.e. encryption of 
personal data. 
Because of the nature of SCM systems, it is not possible to determine the usage of the data, but the 
sensitivity of the data can be considered. The sensitivity impacts of the data are: 
m Denial: Denial of access to the information for different time periods; 
m Destruction: Destruction of the information; 
• Disclosure: Unauthorised disclosure of information; 
Modification: Accidental or deliberate alteration of data; 
m Resilience: Ensuring the survivability and continuation of the SCM. 
The data impacts are determined as percentages and these are converted to ratings, which are low, 
medium or high (low is equal to baseline security, and high the maximum protection that is offered). 
The sensitivity values and data types are determined by answering a series of security related 
questions, the results are then used to produce a security profile of the organisation under review. 
Figure 3 shows the steps involved in determining the organisational requirement. 
Data 
Sensitivity ~ 
// 1 ~.'~. /. ~ ~ 
Overall 
Disclosure 
Impact 
Overall 
Denial 
Impact 
Figure 3: Data sensitivity model 
5. Conclusion 
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In conclusion, this paper has built upon previous research that has highlighted the importance of the 
security issues of SCM and their importance to the critical infrastructure of a country. 
A new security risk analysis method, ODESSA-SCM to protect against security SCM threats has been 
proposed by this paper. The next stage is to develop the model further with a number of SCM security 
scenarios from Australia and overseas. This will allow for a greater understanding of the complexity of 
SCM security and risks and also help to identify some of the unique risk issue that are SCM related. 
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Further research is still required to develop the ODESSA-SCM methodology and apply the ODESSA-
SCM to other types of SCM critical infrastructure systems. The next stage of the research will be to 
validate the method using a number of real life case studies and help to develop security 
management strategies and approaches in order to protect Australian critical infrastructure. 
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